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Identzfiing the Probability of an Accident Occurring 
IDENTIFYING THE PROBABILITY OFANACCDENT OCCURRING 
WITH SUSPECTED UNAPPRO KED PARTS 
AS A CONTRBUTmG FACTOR 
Brett J. Baker 
The purpose of this study was to determine if aircraft accidents and incidents, which involve Suspected Unapproved 
Parts (SUPs), are a major threat to aviation safety. In order to make this determination, the study sought to establish 
the probability of such an event occurring. The Federal Aviation Administration's Ofice of System Safety provided 
general aviation accident and incident data for the period spanning 1987 to 1999. In an attempt to provide the most 
accurate results, the full sub-population was studied, and subsequently analpd using descriptive statistics. SUPs were 
found to contribute to 0.008225 mishaps every 100,000 flight hours, approximately 1,928 times less than the national 
accident and incident rate of 15.8667 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. As a result, the null hypothesis was rejected 
and the conclusion drawn that the probability of an accident andlor incident occurring with SUPs as either a causal or 
contributory factor is unlikely. 
INTRODUCTION 
Aircraft parts that are not eligible for installation do 
circumvent the controls set forth by the Department of 
Transportation @OT) and Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), whether by inadvertent or deliberate action. The 
potential for loss of life, an aircraft hull loss, or other 
catastrophe, with Suspected Unapproved Parts (SUPs) as a 
contributing hctor in an accident or incident must be 
considered. Therefore, it is necessary that the magnitude of 
the SUP problem be identified thereby allowing corrective 
action to be. made by the appropriate authorities and 
allowing potential users of SUPS to identify the threat. 
Statement of the Problem 
The danger posed by SUPs is enough to threaten a 
significant economic loss to an aircraft owner or operator, 
as well as jeopardizing human life. The authorities plan to 
minimize this danger by "promoting the highest level of 
aviation safety by eliminating the potential safety risk posed 
by the entry of unapproved parts in the United States 
aviation community" (FAA, 1995, p. vi). The Federal 
Aviation Administration began this process by defining a 
SUP as any part, component, or material that is suspected 
of not meeting the requirements of an approved part; that 
is a "part that has received a formal Federal Aviation 
Administration approval" (FAA, 1995, p. 18). In addition, 
a SUP working group was formed within the FAA to 
develop a plan to address the SUP issue. Despite these 
efforts, the size and extent of the SUP problem remains 
unknown. 
Review of Related Literature 
Unapproved parts have become a cause for concern over 
the past decade, yet unapproved parts have not developed 
into a significant statistical factor in aircraft accident 
investigations. The dangers posed by the installation and 
use of unapproved parts not only threatens the US aviation 
industry, but reach beyond the borders ofthe US with many 
airlines in developing nations, particularly those located in 
Afica and South America, "knowingly and openly 
placing unapproved parts into service (Stern, 1996). The 
number of unapproved parts placed in service within less 
developed countries is primarily due to virtually 
nonexistent legislative oversight and control of the air 
transport industry in these regions. Under ideal 
circumstances unapproved parts are prohibited fiom bemg 
installed on an aircraft by a comprehensive network of 
controls that govern the design and manuf cture of aircraft 
parts within the US. Additional inspections and checks 
occur between the manuhcture and the installation of the 
aeronautical part by the maintenance technician who 
purchases the part or selects it fiom a parts room for 
installation on an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or 
other component (FAA, 1995). Nonetheless, parts that are 
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not eligible for installation do circumvent these controls, 
whether by inadvertent or deliberate action. 
History of Suspected Unapproved Parts 
Although the problem of unapproved parts has come to 
the publics' attention in recent years through the broadcast 
media, congressional hearings and written press, the 
problem has posed a potential threat to the aviation 
industry for several decades. In 1957 the Flight Sakty 
Foundation (FSF) warned that the "stream of parts 
necessary for the maintenance and overhaul of aircraft 
engines has become polluted." Wi+in the report, Joseph 
Chase described the growth of the suspected unapproved 
part problem. "Parts that are not airworthy, parts the source 
and identity ofwhich have long been lost, parts of unknown 
material, fibricated by processes at variance with industry 
and government specifications, have entered the channels 
of trade" (Chase, 1957, p. 3). The report traced the origin 
of these unapproved parts to the years that immediately 
followed World War 11. This growth in SUPs was 
determined to be primarily due to the vast numbers of 
aircraft engines that were sold by the US Government as 
surplus, and with the engine manufctuters' decision to no 
longer produce or stock replacement parts for those war 
time models. Following these events "many new and 
genuine surplus parts had lost their identity in the process 
of sale and resale, shipment and transshipment. Original 
packages had been opened and destroyed. Markings had 
been obliterated" (Chase, 1957, p. 4). 
As these parts could not be determined to be genuine, it 
became unacceptable to the US Civil Aeronautics 
Administration, the forerunner of the FAA, to install these 
parts in aircraft. As the supply of usable parts diminished, 
the economic laws of supply and demand prevailed, driving 
the price up. The price increase in parts encouraged dealers 
and brokers to allow uncertified part. into the market. 
Chase went on to write that "We might have forgiven the 
people involved.. .they were dealing in genuine parts even 
though these parts could not be identified positively as such 
and so could not be used in certificated aircraft" (1 957, p. 
4). With business ethics weakened or destroyed, it was but 
one step to modifying parts without the benefit of 
engineering data, and another step to outright 
counterfeiting (Chase, 1957). 
In 1964, Chase again expressed concern about the 
prolifkration of unapproved aircraft parts. 
Many of the difficulties remain unchanged.. .they 
are marked with the.. . part number ofthe original 
manufscturer and represented by the supplier as 
'Surplus, New, or Serviceable.' Their record has 
been anything but reassuring. Deviations fiom the 
conditions represented ran the full scale fiom 
honest mistakes.. .to outright hud .  (Chase, 1964, 
P. 5). 
He concluded the report by stating, "bogus parts continue 
to be a threat to aviation sakty" (Chase, 1964, p. 8). 
The problem of SUPs has not been limited to fixed wing 
aircraft; it poses a significant threat to helicopters which 
are especially vulnerable to substandard critical parts. The 
threat to helicopters fiom SUPs predates 1980 to the US 
involvement in the Vietnam War. "Many of these parts 
undoubtedly came fiom the almost 6,000 helicopters 
destroyed or captured in... Vietnam (Robinson, 1993, p. 
1 O)." Many of these SUPs would have mtered the US in the 
early 1980s and may continue to be imported into the US 
even today (Robinson, 1993). 
Accidents Attributed To Unapproved Parts 
Air travel is one of the safest modes of transport, 
according to the National Safety Council (1998) and 
Bureau ofTransportation Statistics (I 996). The fitalityrate 
for people traveling by car, for example, was 1 10 times 
greater than the rate for people traveling on scheduled US 
airlines (National Safety Council, 1998). Despite an 
outstanding safety record, the industry has experienced 
accidents that can be attributed to unapproved parts. 
According to Stem (1 996), accidents whose cause has been 
confirmed to be the result ofthe installation and subsequent 
f ilure of unapproved parts in the US include: A Louisiana 
crop duster, who was killed in 1992 when his aircraft nose- 
dived shortly after takeoff. Accident investigators found an 
unapproved part in the propeller's pitch control unit that 
had been installed by a local aircraft technician (Stern, 
1996). The aircraft technician pled guilty to making Mse 
statements on maintenance documents and was fined 
$10,000. In the past several years, two more f t a l  crashes 
involving private aircraft have occurred, including a Cessna 
172 that crashed on takeoff in September 1994, in 
Oklahoma City, killing two people. National 
Transportation Safety Board investigators found that 
unapproved engine bearings led to the accident (Stern, 
1996). In October 1995, another pilot was killed in 
Longmont, Colorado when an unapproved propeller filed 
in flight (Stern, 1996). 
Outside the US the record is even more troubling. The 
worst c o n h e d  accident, according to a report by the 
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Flight Safety Foundation in 1994, occurred on September 
8, 1989 and involved a Convair 580 aircraft belonging to 
Norway's Partnair charter airline. The aircraft on route 
fkom Oslo, Norway to Hamburg, Germany disintegrated 
22,000 feet over the North Sea, killing all 55 people 
aboard. Norwegian investigators recovered 90% ofthe 36- 
year-old plane and determined the cause of the accident to 
be a result of counterfeit bolts, bushings, and brackets in 
the aimaft's tail. A m d i n g  to the Norwegian 
investigating authority, the plane's tail vibrated violently as 
the bolts came loose and fell off in mi&& (FSF, 1994). 
Lawyers for the now defunct airline reportedly denied that 
unapproved parts caused the crash. 
Recently, airlines have become increasingly concerned 
with the issues posed by unairworthy parts and their effects 
on the air transportation system. American Airlines made 
public a 14-page list, complete with serial numbers, ofparts 
missing fiom the remains ofFlight 965 after it crashed near 
Cali, Colombia in December 1995 (Bajak, 1996). This 
public announcement is unprecedented within the industry. 
Parts Considered To Be A m t a b l e  For Aeronautical Use 
There are a number of acceptable methods for 
-aeronautical parts to be designed and produced, most of 
these methods require specific FAA approvals. This is 
usually the case for major aircraft products such as 
airfiames, engines, and propellers, as well as key 
components or parts that could significantly afkct the 
operation and safety of an aircraft. The FAA grants 
approvals only on the basis of a stringent overview of 
design criteria, facilities, processes and quality control 
systems (FAA, 1995). FAA Production Approval Holders 
(PAH) are subject to continual FAA surveillance and 
inspection to verie their compliance with the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (FAR) and the conditions of their 
approvals (FAA, 1995). 
There are a number of sources of acceptable parts that are 
not produced under specific FAA approvals. For example, 
it is permissible for the owner or operator of an aircraft to 
"produce parts for maintaining or altering that person's 
own product" (FAA, 1998, p. 3). Manufkcturers often 
specifL that it is acceptable to use "standard parts," such as 
nuts and bolts, for production and maintenance. Standard 
parts production is not monitored by the FAA, but must 
conform to specified industry accepted criteria. Standard 
parts can be tested for conformity and may be used in 
aeronautical products only when specified in the design 
(FAA, 1998). Other parts not formally approved by the 
FAA that are acceptable if used in the proper application 
are parts "fabricated" by maintenance personnel in the 
course of performing a repair and returning a product to 
service (FAA, 1998). However, such parts are still required 
to meet applicable design criteria as explained by the 
following definition. 
Standard Part. A part manufactured in complete 
compliance with an established industry or US 
government specification which includes design, 
manufacturing, test and acceptance criteria, and 
uniform identification requirements; or for a type 
of part which the Administrator has found 
demonstrates conformity based solely on meeting 
performance criteria, is in complete conformance 
with an established industry or US Government 
specification which contains performance criteria, 
test and acceptance criteria, and uniform 
identification requirements. The specifications 
must include all information necessary to produce 
and conform the part, and be published so that any 
party may manuhcture the part. Examples include 
but are not limited to, National Aerospace 
Standards (NAS), ArmyMavy (AN) , Society of 
Automotive Engineers (SAE) , SAE Sematec, 
Joint Electron Device Engineering Council, Joint 
Electron Tube Engineering Council, and 
American National Standard Institute (ANSI) 
standards. (FAA, 1998, p. 4). 
In addition to regulating the design and 
manufacture of aeronautical parts, the FAA regulates the 
individuals and organizations that use parts. These 
regulations specifi/ quality control and inspection 
procedures for certificate holders such as air carriers and 
repair stations, which include procedures to carefilly 
inspect incoming materials and parts for authenticity and 
conformity with applicable standards as outlined in 
Advisory Circular (AC) 21-29B (FAA, 1998). These 
controls are designed to ensure that parts that are produced 
and used meet applicable design requirements, are eligible 
for installation, and are appropriate for a given situation. 
However, there are numerous sources of parts that do not 
meet applicable requirements but do enter the aviation 
system. Collectively, these parts are called "unapproved 
parts". 
Parts Considered To Be Unsuitable For 
Aeronautical Use 
The intentional installation ofunapproved parts on 
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an aircraft is punishable under civil and criminal law. If 
caught a person may be charged with hlsifjing statements, 
committing wire fiaud, mail fiaud, and endangering the 
safety of an aircraft which is punishable by h e s  or prison 
(FAA, 1994). To avoid the inadvertent installation of parts 
considered unsuitable for aeronautical use, unapproved 
parts are defined within Advisory Circular 21-29B, 
Detecting and Reporting Suspected Unapproved Parts 
(FAA, 1998, p. 4): 
A part that does not meet the 
requirements of an "apprgved part." This term 
also includes parts which have been improperly 
returned to service (contrary to FAR parts 43 or 
145) andlor parts which may hll under one or 
more of the following categories: 
1) Parts shipped directly to the user by a 
manuhcturer, supplier, or distributor, where 
the parts were not produced under the 
authority of an FAA production approval for 
the part, such as production overruns where 
the parts did not pass through an approved 
quality control system. 
2) New parts which have passed through a PAH 
quality control system which are found not to 
conform to the approved desigddata. 
3) Parts that have been maintained, rebuilt, 
altered, overhauled, or approved for return to 
service by persons or Gcilities not authorized 
to perform such services under FAR parts 43 
and/or 145. 
4) Parts that have been maintained, rebuilt, 
altered, or approved for return to service 
which are subsequently found not to conform 
to approved data. 
5) Counterfeit parts. 
A summary ofparts that may constitute an unapproved part 
may be found in Table 1. 
Counterfeit parts, a type of "unapproved part," may be 
new parts that are deliberately misrepresented as designed 
and produced under an approved system or other acceptable 
method even though they were not designed and produced 
under such a system. Counterfeit parts may also be used 
parts that, even though they were produced under an 
approved system, have reached a designed life limit or have 
been damaged beyond possible repair for aviation 
standards, but are altered and deliberately misrepresented 
as acceptable, with the intent to mislead or dehud. 
If an "approved part" is not salvageable, i.e., thought to be 
worth saving under controlled conditions for potential 
future repair, it is considered scrap and should be disposed 
of in such a way that it cannot be returned to service. 
However, if a part is salvageable, it should be "documented 
and controlled so that it is not returned to aviation service 
until all requirements are met." (FAA, 1995, p. 58). Both 
salvageable and scrap parts are sometimes misrepresented 
as having useful time left or as having been repaired in 
accordance with regulations. 
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Table 1 
Summary of What Constitutes an Unavuroved Part 
Bogus and Unarmroved Parts 
* NewParts 
No Production Approval (Counterfeit and Fraudulently Manufa ctured Parts) 
No Individual Production Approval (Current PAH Relationship-But Also Manufacture 
Other Parts-PMA Issues) 
Rejected Parts Sold by PAH 
Scrav/Used Parts K 
Counterkit and Fraudulently Overhauled Repaired Parts 
Salvaged Parts From Stolen, Scrapped or Crashed Aircraft 
Military Swplus Parts (Not FAA Approved) 
Inventory Exceeding Shelf Life AndIOr Unknown Origin 
OwnerIOperator Produced or Modified Parts Sold by Another Party 
Susvected U I ~ ~ V D ~ O V ~ ~  Parts: The Paverwork Problem 
I New Parts An Approved Part with Missing Paperwork 
Note. Adapted From Una~~roved h l a n e  Parts and Air Safetv, 104 Cong., 1st. Sess. (1995) (Testimony of Mary Schiavo) 
- 
Other examples of parts that are not eligible for use, or 
"unapproved parts," are parts rejected during the 
production process because of defects; parts for which 
required documentation has been lost; parts that have not 
been properly maintained, and parts fiom military aircraft 
that have 'hot been shown to comply with FAA 
requirements" (FAA, 1995, p. 3). 
Unapproved parts also occur when a supplier, that 
produces parts for an approved manufacture, directly ships 
to end users without the approved manuhcturers' 
authorization or a separate, applicable Parts Manufscturer 
Approval (PMA). An example of this is "production 
overrun" parts. These parts are not authorized by the PA& 
so it cannot be assumed that they have undergone all ofthe 
requirements of the approved holder's required quality 
control process. 
Unapproved parts have been found to be a determining 
cause of several accidents and incidents involving private 
UsedParts 
A Properly Repaired Part Which Was Certified But Paperwork Lost 
and commercial aircraft, worldwide. Unapproved parts 
played a role in at least 166 US based aircraft accidents or 
incidents (Bajak, 1996). Four of these accidents involved 
commercial carriers that resulted in six fatalities. However, 
just how many unairworthy parts have claimed lives is in 
dispute. The number may be i%r greater according to James 
Frisbee, quality control chief at Northwest Airlines, "It's 
very, very hard to pin the cause of an accident on a part that 
has failed.. .especially when the airplane is scattered over 
five acres" (Frisbee, 1995). 
Official Status of Una~~roved Parts 
There have been few formal studies conducted to try and 
determine the statistical probability of unapproved aircraft 
parts being a contributing factor in an aircraft accident or 
incident within the US. However, a rudimentary search of 
the FAA accident and incident database by the Associated 
Press found that unapproved parts played a role in 
approximately 166 aircraft accidents or less serious 
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incidents fiom May 1973 through April 1996, resulting in 
17 deaths and 39 injuries (Bajak, 1996). According to 
Baurngarner (1 995) the FAA has received fewer than 1300 
reports of SUPs since 1989; and investigations have led to 
over 100 enforcement actions. Despite the low number of 
-. SUP reports, it should be noted that each SUP report can 
constitute thousands of illegal parts, for example the 
grounding of 6,000 light aircraft powered by Textron 
Lycoming reciprocating engines for inspection for 
unapproved bolts (Baumgarner, 1995). The SUP problem 
is further exemplified in a Flight, SafeQ Digest (1994) 
report which stated that a US Department of 
Transportation's (DOT) Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) audit of 12 repair stations found that of parts 
sampled, "43 percent of all newly purchased parts and 95 
pacent of parts purchased fiom distributors or brokers did 
not have reasonable evidence of either FAA production 
approval status, production origin or conformance with 
established U.S. or industry specifications" (p. 1). 
The literature supports the idea that regulatory control is 
inadequate and the problem of SUPs is aggravated further 
by the fact that the FAA does not have enough money or 
inspectors to monitor the nation's 2,000 parts distributors 
and brokers. 
US Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) do not prohibit 
the sale or distribution of unapproved parts; therefore, this 
problem is further exaggerated ("Bogus Parts," 1994). 
Despite widespread claims that illegal parts traffic poses 
a major safety threat, Schultz (1995) claims that SUPs pose 
a very limited risk, and that aviation sa* statistics appear 
to remain largely unaffected by SUPs. The question 
remains though, with no assessment of the risk magnitude 
or the &lure consequence of a part, is this statement 
unbiased? The DOTIOIG has underscored the importance 
of developing or obtaining statistical information with 
regards to monitoring SUPs within the aviation community 
(FAA, 1995). 
Although investigations of hudulent aircraft parts 
launched by the DOTIOIG have led to 164 indictments and 
130 convictions since 1990, such actions do not appear to 
have been a deterrent. There are 26 million parts installed 
on aircraft each year within the US. If only two percent of 
these parts have been intentionally substituted with 
counterfeit parts, as estimated by an internal 1995 FAA 
audit, that leaves more than half a million unapproved parts 
installed every year (Stern, 1996). 
Summary 
Despite the overwhelming view presented within the 
literature, that SUPs present a danger to the nation's fleet, 
not all concerned parties have acknowledged the problem. 
The FAA has disputed many of the claims made by the 
DOTIOIG and "contends that bogus parts have never 
caused a plane to crash, and that there is no increase in the 
number of bogus parts, just more reports" (Schiavo, 1997, 
p. 256). The FAA has maintained the argument that "there 
is no safety problem associated with undocumented parts: 
there is no safety problem associated with Parts 
Manufacture Approvals, and that they have never 
encountered an accident caused by a counterfeit or 
hudulently documented part9'(Air Transport World, 1994, 
p. 1). However, this view differs significantly fiom those of 
the Professional Airways System Specialists (PASS), a 
union representing FAA engineers and electricians. In 
testimony presented to Congress, PASS stated; 
Unfortunately, PASS strongly believes that 
aviation safety is seriously jeopardized by the 
FAA's continued failure to identi@ and to curtail 
the use of suspected unapproved parts in our 
nation's aircra ft...The production of unapproved 
parts is egregious and out of control. Eventually, 
PASS fears that bogus parts will have a direct 
adverse impact on operating safety and on the 
unsuspecting flying public. (1 04 Cong., 1995). 
Other organizations have also conveyed that this problem 
is new, that it is rapidly growing, and that it presents a 
major threat, in the present or future, to aviation safety 
(Schiavo, 1997). However, the FAA is unaware of any 
evidence that shows that instances (of saw-related 
unapproved parts being sold are substantially more 
prevalent now than a few years ago (FAA, 1995). 
Pressure to improve safety will continue to be placed 
upon the administrative branches of Government. Political 
pressure will continue to drive technically unreasonable 
demands on safety regulators, and make outrageous claims 
about safety problems, or safety improvements. Newspapers 
and television will continue to sensationalize air safety 
issues, as a result politicians can be expected to take 
advantage of potential press coverage, and make demands 
or claims that do not advance anything but coverage of 
their own statements. Cries to "do something," regardless 
of the significance of the problem or the practicality of the 
proposed solution is the unfortunate result of such coverage 
(Broderick, 1997). These "false alarms" result in wasted 
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resources and provide instant credibility to those who 
criticize air safety authorities or programs. Taken together, 
these factors create a bureaucratic environment that 
encourages that excessive resources be allocated to air 
safety programs, resources far in excess of other similar (or 
even more deserving) government programs (Broderick, 
1997). They also provide a regulatory environment that 
permits extraordinarily high levels of safety by imposing 
systems and procedures on the aviation industry. 
Statement of the Hwothesis 
It is hypothesized that the probability gf an accident 
andlor incident occurring with Suspected Unapproved Parts 
being a causal or contributory factor is significant. 
METHOD 
Subiects 
Study participants consisted of aircraft that had been 
involved in either an accident or incident between January 
1987 and March 1999. However, physical evidence left by 
the majority of these events had become intangible with 
time. In addition, economic and time constraints forced the 
author to rely on official accounts of each accident or 
incident in order to determine what role SUPs had played, 
if any. Therefore, each aircraft was represented by a fctual 
accident or incident report filed as a matter of public 
record. Records were limited to those that were retrievable 
from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and FAA 
accidentlincident databases. Additional criteria f i e r  
defined the subjects; only those aircraft that could be 
considered to f 11 within the classification of general 
aviation were selected. For the purposes of this study, 
general aviation was considered to consist of normal 
category fixed wing aircraft and rotorcraft, if they had a 
seating configuration, excluding pilot seats, ofnine or less, 
and a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,400 
pounds or less. An additional requirement was that aircraft 
operating under Federal Aviation Regulation, Part 135, 
(FAA, 1994) were excluded from the study. Sampling bias 
was limited by avoiding aircraft activity indicators that did 
not reflect differences in frequency of landing and takeoff 
or route length. A means of avoiding or eliminating 
sampling bias created by under reporting could not be 
established. 
Instrument 
The instrument utilized during this study consisted of 
the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), National 
Transportation Safety Board (N.T.S.B.) and FAA 
acciddicident databases. Data retrieved from these 
databases were obtained under the Freedom of 
Information act, and procured from one of two sources: 
(a) a public domain database located on-line at 
h~://www.asy.faa.go~/asp/asy~~~osssys.~, and (b) cd- 
rom edition, located at the Jack R Hunt Memorial 
Library at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, 
Daytona Beach. 
Reliability and validity were dependent upon the design 
and content of these databases. Although varying 
representations of the data were found between databases, 
data elements used within this study were standardized. 
The data were presented for analysis in a brief report 
h a t  that was divided into the following categories: 
location information, aircraft i n h a t i o n ,  operator 
information, narrative, sequence of events, findings, injury 
summary, weatherlenvironmental information and pilot 
information. 
However, an additional measure was incorporated into 
the handling of the instrument in an effort to M e r  
increase the studies reliability and validity. In order fbr 
narrative data to be standardized, the narrative discussion 
had to be converted to a numerical value. In order to 
achieve this, the level of damage for each incident andlor 
accident was categorized in terms of mishap severity, as 
defined within MIL-STD-882D (1997). The reliability 
coefficient is considered high as the data and its subsequent 
analysis did not require subjectivity, but relied on consistent 
and hctual information in order to draw a conclusion. 
Desinn 
The research method used within this study had to have 
the ability to test a hypothesis, investigate relationships, 
and describe conditions. In addition, when determining the 
type of methodology to utilize in this study, the technique 
for collecting data, data format, and the number of valid 
subjects had to be considered to ensure both data and 
method were compatible. A quantitative approach was 
selected to test the hypothesis, and the focus narrowed so 
that the descriptive method, outlined in the textbook 
Educational Research, by Gay (1996, p.19), was used 
exclusively. This provided the author the ability to test the 
hypothesis that the probability of an accident andlor 
incident occurring with SUPs being a causal or contributory 
fgctor is significant. 
Procedure 
The data utilized for this study was obtained fiom the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), National 
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Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and FAA 
accidentlincident databases. Retrieving data fiom these 
databases was made possible by the use of two separate 
resources, (a) a public domain database located on-line at 
http://www.asy.h.gov/asp/asyYcr~ssys.asp, and (b) cd- 
4 rom edition, located at the Jack R Hunt Memorial Library 
at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach. 
The use of FAA Form 8120- 1 1,8020-2 and NTSB Form 
6120.19A and 6120.4 by the authorities allows data to be 
presented in a consistent and manageable form, improving 
integration across databases. Howeyer, the synopsis found 
within each accident and incident report could not be 
interpreted consistently without translating the narrative 
text into a numerical value. In order to achieve this MUL- 
STD-882D, (1 997) mishap severity categories, were used to 
d e h e  the level of damage for each incident or accident. 
The search queries used to retrieve the data fiom these 
databases utilized the following search terms: bogus parts, 
unapproved parts, counterfeit parts, suspected unapproved 
parts, and SUP. The records rehmed by these searches 
were then screened to ensure that they met the requirements 
defined earlier in this chapter, ensuring that the desired 
sample was obtained. 
The data was then sorted and ranked according to date, 
and mishap severity. This enabled the records to be 
analyzed using descriptive statistics, as outlined in A 
Proerammed Introduction To Statistics (Elzey, 1971) and 
Comulete Business Statistics (Aczel, 1996). The primary 
measure used to evaluate the SUP combined accident and 
incident (CAI) rate was the monthly accident/incident rate, 
per 100,000 flight hours, which was calculated using 
Equation 1. 
Monthly CAI Rate - No. of CAI in Month x 100,000 (1) 
(per 100,000 flight hours) No. of Flight Hours in Month 
Additional data was required to solve Equation 1, which 
was not available fiom the accident and incident databases 
described previously. This data was obtained fiom the FAA 
Office of System Safety located on-line at 
http://www.asy.h.go~/safety~analysiS!si.zip. 
The use of combied accident and incident rates (per 
100,000 flight hours) has the effect of making the 
combined accident and incident rate an equal measure 
across months. That is, despite a fluctuating number of 
flight hours flown per month or number of days available 
for flight within the month, the rate provides a consistent 
measure across months. In addition, a twelve-month 
moving average was used in order to dampen seasonal and 
other fluctuations in the data. The twelve-month moving 
average rate indicates the number of combined accidents 
and incidents that occurred over the twelve proceeding 
months divided by the total number of flight hours flown in 
the preceding twelve months. 
The realization that the term "significant" would have to be 
further defined, prior to completing analysis of the data, 
was made early in the study. What could be considered a 
significant number ofaircraft: accidents or incidents, caused 
by SUPs? The best means of accomplishing this was 
determined to be a comparison between the rate of 
accidents and incidents involving SUPs and the accident 
and incident rate of accidents that did not involve SUPs. 
This was accomplished in terms of probability as shown in 
Table 2, and was applied to the CAI rptes per 100,000 
flight hours. 
Once the data had been analyzed, the results were 
compared to the null and alternate hypotheses. The Null 
hypothesis a) states that "the probability of an accident 
andlor incident occurring with SUPs being a causal or 
contributory factor in a mishap is significant," while the 
alternate hypothesis (H,) is defined as "the probability of an 
accident andlor incident occurring with SUPs being a 
causal or contributory bctor is minor". 
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Table 2 
What C ~stitutes a Significant Number of Accidents and Incidents? 
Interpretation E 
Event is not very likely to occur 0.00 to 0.24 
Event is more likely not to occur than to occur 0.25 to 0.49 
Event is as likely to occur as not to occur 0.50 
Event is more likely to occur than not to occur 0.5 1 to 0.74 
Event is very likely to occur 0.75 to 1.00 
m. Adapted fiom Com~lete Business Statistics, 1996, p. 65 
t 
ANALYSIS 
A total of 54,184 accidents and incidents occurred within 
the transportation category of general aviation between 
January 1987 and March 1999 (FAA, 1999). Two sets of 
data were calculated; the first providing the proportion of 
accidents and incidents with SUPS as either causal or 
contributory factors, in relation to the number of flight 
hours flown. The first data set shall be referred to within 
this narrative as CAIR(SUP). The second set of data 
provides the sum of accidents and incidents per 100,000 
flight hours far all accidents and incidents nationwide that 
fell within the class of general aviation. This second set of 
data is intended to serve as a benchmark to compare the 
first set of data and was assigned the label CAIR(NAT). It 
should be observed that a complete data set for the period 
spanning January 1999 and March 1999 was not available, 
hence CAIR(NAT) for this period were not included in the 
analysis of data. The size of the sample CAIR(SUP) was 
147 months while the population CAIRWAT) was limited 
to 144 months. 
As mentioned previously, CAIR(SUP)-represents 
observations made over a period of 12 and a 114 years. 
During this interval, according to records retrieved 
fiom the ASRS, NTSB, and FAA accidentlincident 
databases, initial results indicated a combination of 62 
accidents and incidents. Despite having used specific 
search criteria each of the 62 associated records was 
screened to ensure they met the needs of the study. Of these 
records, approximately half met the prerequisite 
requirements defined within the methodology. Those 
records that did not meet the prerequisites were not 
included within the study. For example, the search term 
SUP returned records containing information irrelevant to 
this study, the search engine having con- the acronym 
SUP and the p r e k  sup used in words such as supervised, 
supercharged and supply. The record attrition was 
exaggerated fUrther by the lack of statistical data prior to 
1987. The absence of data for this period increased the 
record attrition by an additional five records. A summary of 
records returned by the database search is show6 in Table 
3. 
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Table 3 
Summarv of Record Treatment 
Records 
Search Criteria Returned Attrition 
Bogus Parts 8 3 
Counterfeit Parts 3 1 
SUP 16 16 
Suspected Unapproved Part 3 1 
Unapproved Part 32 6 
Total Number of Records I 62 - 
Number of Usable Recordsa - 32 
m. 'Thenumber of usable records reflects the total number of 
returned records minus the record attrition. 
The data set representing CAIR(SUP) was determined to 
have a mean of 0.008225 - = 0.020436) with a total of 
147 observations and a confidence interval at the 95% level 
of 0.0033. The range equaled 0.1038, while the minimum 
number of combined accidents and incidents CAI per 
100,000 flight hours were zero and the maximum number 
shown to have occurred was 0.1038 CAI per 100,000 flight 
hours. The mode and median of this data set are both equal 
to zero. CAIR(SUP) is a positively skewed leptokurtic 
distribution with a kurtosis value of 6.028 1 and a skewness 
value of 2.53681 7. 
In contrast, the data set representing CAIR(NAT) has a 
mean value of 15.8667 CAI per 100,000 flight hours (SDs 
= 2.8126). The number of CAIR(NAT) observations, as 
mentioned previously, differs fiom that of CAIR(SUP) in 
that it was limited to 144 observations. A confidence level 
of 95% produced a value of 0.4633. The mode was not 
applicable to this data set as each observation differed, 
however the median was equal to 15.8667 CAI per 100,000 
flight hours. The range equaled 14.3876, while the 
minimum number of CAI per 100,000 flight hours was 
8.8369 and the maximum number that occurred was 
23.2245. 
In addition to CAIR(SUP), the accident and/or incident 
severity was determined for accidents and incidents having 
SUPS as either a causal or contributory factor using a 
definition ofhazard severity obtaiied&om the Department 
of Defense publication, MIL-STD-882D. The review of 
accident and incident severity revealed that the majority of 
mishaps fell within the classification ofthe critical category 
(40.74 %), and catastrophic category (37.04 %). The 
catastrophic category and the critical category 
are equivalent to the NTSB definition of an accident, while 
the marginal category (7.41%) and the negligible category 
(14.81%) in turn meet the NTSB definition an incident. 
The accident and incident rate, per 100,000 flight hours, 
in relation to time is presented in Figure 1. The twelve- 
month moving average for each year was used to plot each 
point in order to dampen seasonal, or other fluctuations in 
data. Due to the logarithmic scale of Figure 1, the graph 
line symbolizing CAIR(SUP) is interrupted for the periods 
representing 1987 to 1988,1989 to 1992 and 1997 to 1999. 
These interruptions represent a value of zero CAI per 
100,000 flight hours. The line is presented at a much larger 
scale in Figure 2, and can be seen to fluctuate alternately 
between 0 and 0.0 1 CAI per 100,000 flight hours with the 
exception of the period that falls between 1993 and 1995 
where the CAI rate increased to a maximum of 0.03337 
CAI per 100,000 flight hours. The line representing 
CAIR(NAT) remains relatively constant, with a very 
gradual decrease after 1993. However, at no point does the 
line drop below 10 CAI per 100,000 flight hours. 
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I -+-Combined Accident and Incident Rate (N.lationa?)U 
0.001 L t Combined Accident and Incident Rate (SUP) 1 
Year 
Figure 1. Accident and Incidents Rate (Per 100,000 Flight .Hours) 
0.04 
- Combined Accident and Incident Rate (SUP) 
0.035 
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
Year 
Figure 2. Combined Accident and Incident Rate (SUP) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study contrast with the majority of 
views held by the popular press, trade organizations, and 
government representatives presented within the review of 
literature. From the data presented in the previous chapter, 
- one must conclude that the probability of an accident or 
incident occurring, which involves SUPS as a contributing 
or causal fkctor, is remote. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
(&) is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis (H,), 
which states that the probability of an accident andlor 
incident occurring with SUPS being q causal or contributory 
factor in a mishap is minimal. 
The rationale for rejecting the null hypothesis centers on 
the dissimilarity between CAIR(SUP) and CAIRWAT). 
Given that the mean CAIR(SUP) equals 0.008225 CAI 
every 100,000 flight hours, a prediction may be used to 
determine when a single accident or incident may be 
expected to occur by solving the unknown variable in the 
followidg ratio, 0.008225: 1 OO,OOO= l :X. This suggests that 
an accident or incident will occur with a SUP as either a 
causal or a contributory fkctor every 1.21 58 X 10' flight 
hours flown. In comparison, a single accident or incident 
can be expected to occur within general aviation at a rate of 
one accident or incident every 6,302.5 1 flight hours flown. 
Note that this value is inclusive of all causal and 
contributory fkctors. Given that between 1987 and 1998 the 
average number of hours flown by general aviation aircraft 
is 2,344,407 flight hours per month it can be said that an 
average of 0.19283 accidents or incidents can be attributed 
to SUPS per month compared to an average of 371.98 
accidents or incidents nationwide every month. These 
predictions compare favorably with the actual CAI rates 
presented within the previous chapter. 
To summarize, the Pocket Guide to Transportation 
(1 998), estimates that the general aviation fleet consisted of 
182,605 aircraft in 1995 and 187,3 12 aircraft in 1996. Of 
these aircraft, 2.3140 could be expected to have been 
damaged or destroyed in SUP related mishaps each year. 
This accident rate is approximately 1,928 times less than 
the national accident and incident rate (based on CAI per 
100,000 flight hours) and therefore cannot be considered 
significant, as defined within chapter two. As a result, the 
alternate hypothesis was found to be favorable. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this study suggest that a pilot flying eight - 
hours daily, in a general aviation category aircraft, would 
not experience an accident or incident involving SUPS for 
4,221.55 years. However, the same pilot under similar 
conditions could expect to experience an accident or 
incident, inclusive of all causal factors, within 2.19 years. 
Given the vast difference in these two probability rates, one 
must reconsider the amount of time and resources that are 
currently being focused to mitigate the risks associated with 
SUPs. Do the number of fatalities and injuries associated 
with an average of 0.19283 CAI, with SUPs as a causal or 
contributory factor, encountered each month within the 
United States justi* the expense of implementing new 
programs and regulations to curb the use of SUPs? 
The author believes that a combination of existing 
Federal Regulations, aircraft design philosophies (e.g., 
Maintenance Steering Group3), and standard industry 
practices such as Reliability Centered Maintenance serve to 
adequately reduce the risk associated with a particular SUP 
component prior to its use and subsequent filure. This 
assertion can be demonstrated by considering the following 
hypothetical scenario. A repair station purchases a 
hydraulic pump, which is to be installed on a light twin 
aircraft. The pump serves as the primary means of 
actuating the landing gear retraction and extension 
mechanism. Upon receipt the part is inspected by an 
authorized inspector, following the basic requirements 
presented within 14 CFR Part 145, the part is then given to 
an aircraft technician. 
The aircraft technician is tasked with installing the 
component on the aircraft, and is mandated by law to 
ensure that the requirements of FAR 21.303, FAR 43.13 
and FAR 145.57 are met. For the purposes of this 
discussion, the probability of the authorized inspector 
hiling to identi6 a SUP amongst parts received fiom a 
vendor or distributor is 11100 (one SUP not correctly 
identified out of every 100 SUPs). In addition, the 
probability ofthemaintenancetechnician installing an SUP 
component, unknowingly, is 1/10 (one SUP not correctly 
identified out of every 10 SUPs). Therefore, taking into 
account the hypothetical probabilities, one out of every 
1,000 SUP components will not have been identified before 
being placed in service. 
A SUP component that escapes detection during this 
process has an additional chance of being discovered 
during future maintenance activities. A SUP component 
should be identified prior to hilure through progressive, 
100 hour, and annual inspections as required by FAR 91, 
Subpart E. The hypothetical probability ofpersonnel hiling 
to identi@ a SUP during an inspection is 1/20 (1 SUP not 
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correctly identified out of every 20). Should a SUP part 
however hi1 to be removed and continue in service until the 
number of cycles flown results in hilure, the redundancy of 
flight critical systems is designed to prevent a catastrophic 
hilure. This design philosophy helps reduce the accident 
and incident rate by SUPs by apportioning risk throughout 
the system, so that a catastrophic failure is nearly 
impossible. Assume that the hypothetical probability of the 
hydraulic motor hiling during operation is 1/1,000 (one 
hilure per 1,000 flights). The hydraulic system 
incorporates a hand operated emergency hydraulic pump, 
which is to be used to lower the aircrafts undercarriage 
should the primary pump fail. The hypothetical failure rate 
for this component, like the hydraulic motor, is 111000 
flights. Under normal circumstances, the redundancy 
designed into this system would have reduced the 
probability of a catastrophic hilure by 1 X lo6. However, 
the hydraulic motor is a counterfeit part that has been 
unknowingly ininstalled on the aircraft and its failure rate is 
1/10 flights. The probability of an accident or incident 
occurring because of this SUP is reduced finther when the 
failure rates of events upstream are calculated, that is 
considering the design, maintenance and inspection 
procedures. In simplistic terms, the probability of 
catastrophic hilure occurring in this scenario is one in 
every two billion flights. This scenario demonstrates that a 
number of filters already exist to remove SUPs fiom the 
system and that aircraft design philosophies and modern 
maintenance practices make the likely hood of a 
catastrophic system failure due to a SUP improbable. 
There can be no doubt that SUPs have manifested 
themselves as a safety problem and that SUPs can be found 
within the nations' aircraft parts inventories. As there is no 
conclusive evidence of the number of SUPs in these parts 
inventories, with the exception of a controversial audit 
conducted by the DOT/OIG (1996), the ratio of parts that 
are rejected from the system and the number of SUPs 
eventually installed on aircraft cannot be determined. 
Although the result of this study suggest that little threat to 
public safety is presented by SUPs, it is incapable of 
determining the relationship between the number of SUPs 
in parts inventories, and the number of SUPs installed 
within the commercial and general aviation aircraft fleet. 
It is therefore recommended that M e r  research is 
conducted to determine this ratio and its effect on the 
national accident and incident rate. 
It has been argued that the dangers of SUPs to airlines 
poses an even greater threat to the flying public. National 
Transportation Statistics (1998) show a significantly lower 
fatality rate for commercial aircraft operations, and it is 
reasonable to suggest that the CAIR(SUP) rate is lower 
than that of general aviation. However, due to passenger 
capacity when an accident or incident does occur with 
SUPs involved, the number of injuries and fatalities can be 
expected to be much higher. 
The public's view that airlines are more concerned with 
profit than safety has played a significant role in SUP 
'hysteria'. The loss of an aircraft can prove to be extremely 
expensive, making it more cost effective to invest in safety 
programs, additional training, etcetera. For example, the 
loss of a scheduled American Airlines flight fiom Miami to 
Cali, Columbia, would have meant a minimum loss of an 
asset valued at 73.5 million dollars (Boeing, 1999). The 
crash of the Boeing 757 required that company 
representatives be flown to Columbia, requiring that 
another aircraft be removed fiom revenue service, in 
addition staff were accommodated and fed at the company's 
expense while the logistics of investigating the accident and 
providing care for grieving h i l y  members, immediately 
a h  the accident took place. In addition, the airline would 
have been liable to pay $75,000 to each h i l y  under the 
Montreal agreement, if the airline was a signatmy, 
otherwise the victims relatives would be eligible to receive 
approximately $13,782 under the Warsaw convention. The 
airline would also forego opportunity costs associated with 
lost revenue and other miscellaneous items. Given these 
unexpected expenses, it is in the best interest of the airline 
to protect their fleet fiom SUPs by purchasing parts @om 
credible suppliers, tracking rotables, destroying 
unairworthy parts before selling them for scrap, and 
following AC 2 1 -29B. 
The allocation of scarce resources to the SUP 'threat' can 
be considered the result of mismanagement by involved 
parties. Over the last ten years, 70.6% of aircraft accidents 
have been caused by human factors. Logic would dictate 
that the greatest reduction in the number of injuries and 
fstalities could be achieved by targeting human factors, by 
using those resources currently allocated to reducing SUPs 
to better train flight crews, maintenance technicians and 
design new technology to help eliminate human error. 
Social and legal issues are in a constant state of flux, and in 
recent years require that those persons or organizations that 
jeopardize public safety within the aviation arena be 
severely penalized. This has resulted in organizations and 
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personnel beiig held liable under tort law for products or 
services that have led to an accident or incident. The threat 
of litigation is increased by the economic doctrines of 
caveat emptor (let the buyer beware), and increasingly 
caveat venditor (let the seller beware) that .provide the 
-. buyer or seller the legal right to demand punitive and 
compensatory compensation for any deficient product. In 
addition, legal precedence is currently being made as a 
direct result of the Value Jet Flight 592 tragedy. If this 
precedence is passed into law, maintenance organizations 
and their employees will be held accountable under 
criminal law. Should maintenance be determined to be the 
cause of an accident, corporate officers and maintenance 
personnel may be indicted for criminal conspiracy and 
manslaughter. These changes in social norms and law 
should have the desired effect of decreasing the number of 
SUPS with the nations' parts inventories.0 
Brett J. Baker earned a Master of Aeronautical Science degree and a Bachelor of Science in Aviation Maintenance 
Management fiom Embry-Riddle AeronauticaI University. He holds FAA airfiame and powerplant certification and is currently 
employed within the engineering department of a major airline. 
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